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THE ATTORNEY'S ROLE IN INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT
VIRGINIA ALDIG HIDAYt
Involuntary commitment respondents in North Carolina are guar-
anteed the right to be represented by counsel. The role of counsel in
commitment proceedings is not enunciated clearly in statutes, case law
or the code of ethics. There are several models of counselpartic#pation
in the commitmentprocess, rangingfrom a strict adversarial stance to a
paternalistic assessment of the client's best interests. Professor Hiday
has conducted a large-scale study of involuntary commitment in North
Carolina, andpart of this studyfocused on theper/ormance of attorneys
in the commitment process. Professor Hiday questioned attorneys
about what theyfelt their roles should be, how they viewed their clients,
whatpreparation was done, and the effects of thesefactors on the com-
mitment proceedings. In this Article Professor Hiday shares her obser-
vations on these aspects of civil commitment. She concludes by
suggesting some guidelines for improving the peformance of attorneys
in the civil commitment process.
The North Carolina General Statutes grant the right to be represented by
counsel to respondents against whom petitions have been brought for involun-
tary hospitalization.1 At each of the four state mental hospitals,2 the State
employs an attorney (Special Counsel) to work full-time representing all per-
sons against whom a petition for involuntary commitment has been brought.3
In judicial districts without state mental hospitals, the State pays appointed
counsel or public defenders to represent respondents unless a respondent re-
tains private counsel. 4
But what does having counsel in civil commitment mean? What func-
tions does an attorney perform in representing persons alleged to be danger-
ously mentally ill?5 Presumably, legal representation is the key to assuring
t Associate Professor of Sociology, North Carolina State University and Visiting Associate
Professor of Psychiatry, University of North Carolina School of Medicine. A.B. 1960, Ph.D. 1973,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This research was supported by Grant Number 5
RO1 MH 30548 from the Center for Crime and Delinquency Studies of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse
and Mental Health Administration of the National Institute of Mental Health. The author wishes
to thank the judges, counsel and clerks without whose cooperation this study would not have been
possible.
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.7(c)(1981).
2. The four State mental hospitals are Broughton in Morganton, Umstead in Butner, Dix in
Raleigh, and Cherry near Goldsboro.
3. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.12 (1981).
4. Id. § 122-58.7(e).
5. This Article deals with representing only the allegedly dangerous mentally ill in civil
commitment. Allegedly dangerous inebriates and the mentally retarded who are allegedly dan-
gerous because of an accom an behavior disorder may be committed as well, and thus they
also are provided counseL Id.§§ 1.2- 58.1 to -.7(e).
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that due process rights are protected; 6 but beyond insisting on the regularity of
proceedings, counsel's role in civil commitment is not clearly specified in legal
tradition, statutes, case law or the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.7
As in any other type of case, an attorney should act to further his client's best
interests; but in the area of civil commitment, there is little agreement on what
constitutes the client's best interests or on who should decide what his or her
best interests are.
This lack of agreement stems from an inherent tension between the in-
tended beneficence of the law and the perceived harshness of the incarceration
and the loss of liberty that are required to give medical help. The state in its
parenspariae role seeks to secure psychiatric treatment and eventual mental
health for those who are unable to secure this help on their own. Yet, in the
process of securing help, civil commitment acts to take away the personal free-
dom of individuals. This aspect of civil commitment is especially noticeable
when the state acts on authority derived from its police power to hospitalize
persons who are allegedly dangerous to others.
If an attorney focuses on the loss of liberty resulting from involuntary
hospitalization, he would take the position that his client's best interests lie in
preventing such loss. Accordingly, his role would be to assume an adversarial
stance towards the commitment petition and to argue against commitment.
On the other hand, if an attorney focuses on the pain and suffering accompa-
nying mental illness and the possibility of alleviating that pain through treat-
ment in a mental hospital, he would argue that a client's best interests lie in
obtaining treatment even if this requires his client to be hospitalized involun-
tarily. His role in this instance would be to facilitate hospitalization by not
assuming a traditional adversarial position.
Who then is to decide a client's interests-the attorney or the client? If
the client is mentally ill, he may be unable to recognize his own best interests.
Should the lawyer then make the decision? But how can the lawyer determine
that the client is mentally ill and needs hospitalization when the question of
the client's mental illness is before the court? Even if the client is mentally ill,
there is no reason to assume that he is necessarily incapable of rational deci-
sions.8 Additionally, because lawyers are not trained to recognize mental ill-
6. Anders v. California, 385 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69
(1932).
7. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA) (1971). For a full discussion of how
little guidance attorneys are given on their role in civil commitment, see Goode, The Role of
Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 Yale L.J. 1540 (1975).
8. Only some mental disorders prevent persons from rational thinking; even then, the per-
son may be capable of rational thinking in some areas and in some periods. See generally Task
Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980).
In North Carolina, mental illness is clearly separated from incompetency in that adjudication
of legal incompetency has no effect on mental hospitalization and vice versa. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 122-55 (1981). The distinction between incompetency and mental illness has also been drawn by
federal courts in cases involving the right to refuse treatment. In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir. 1971), and in Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 906
(1981), the courts ruled that an involuntary mental patient is capable of deciding against psychiat-
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ness, they may be unqualified to make the initial determination that a person
is mentally ill and unable to recognize his own best interests. Often they rely
totally on psychiatric opinion. This deference forces the psychiatrist to assume
the position of determining a client's best interests and thus to determine com-
mitment itself if the psychiatrist decides that it is in the best interest; commit-
ment rates are extremely high (up to one-hundred percent) in the absence of
an adversarial stance by counsel towards commitment.9
When lawyers allow the client to determine his own best interests and
advocate against commitment, the assumption of an adversary role is still diffi-
cult because civil commitment courts tend to be unbalanced in the representa-
tion provided each party. In most civil commitment courts throughout North
Carolina and the United States, the state-as petitioner-is not represented by
legal counsel.' 0 This imbalance upsets the logic of the adversarial system,
which assumes that the best way to achieve justice is for counsel on each side
to present the case most favorable to his client. From conflicting testimony
and argument, the judge will be able to synthesize the fairest and most hu-
mane decision.I In the absence of an adversarial proceeding, facts to substan-
tiate a finding of mental illness and dangerousness may not be brought to light
in court unless a judge assumes the awkward role of examiner as well as judge.
Even when the judge assumes this dual role, the imbalance is not fully recti-
fied because no prehearing investigation informs the judge of appropriate ar-
eas for questions. Furthermore, the judge can question only those witnesses
who are present, which in many cases may be only witnesses who are
favorable to the respondent. This lack of balance combined with the tension
between beneficence and incarceration creates ambiguity in the roles of coun-
sel and the court.
Prior to the spread of the civil rights movement into the area of mental
health, the ambiguity was resolved in favor of theparenspatriae foundation of
civil commitment that dominated the thinking of legislatures, courts and coun-
sel.' 2 Focus on the beneficent aspects of commitment led courts to defer to the
opinions of psychiatrists in determining the best interests of the allegedly men-
ric treatment unless there is a separate finding of incompetency. See D. Wexler, Mental Health
Law: Major Issues 39-51 (1981).
9. For empirical research reports of these findings, see Andalman & Chambers, Effective
Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic and a Proposal, 45 Miss.
L.J. 43 (1974); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney in the Commitment of the Mentally I11, 44
Tex. L. Rev. 424 (1966); Hiday, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment: Changes, Effects,
Determinants, 5 J. Psychiatry & L. 551 (1977); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commit-
ment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 816 (1974); Zander, Civil Commitment
in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmid, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 503; Special Project, The
Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1971);
Project, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legisla-
tion, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 1284 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Iowa Project].
10. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.24 (1981) provides for the representation of the State in commit-
ment hearings only at the four regional mental hospitals. There is no provision for the representa-
tion of the State in commitment proceedings at other locations.
11. J. Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (1949); Barrett, The
Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 Notre Dame Law. 479 (1962); Goode, supra
note 7; Zander, supra note 9.
12. N. Kittrie, The Right to Be Different (1971); D. Wexler, supra note 8, at 39-51.
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tally ill. Indeed, the deference was so great that courts essentially defaulted in
their responsibility to make judicial determinations for commitment. 13
Abuses were plentiful, and many persons who were neither mentally ill nor
dangerous found themselves involuntarily hospitalized for indefinite periods.
In most cases, attorneys did essentially nothing to assure their clients of proce-
dural or substantive protection.'
4
In various studies in six states, respondents' lawyers were described in
terms such as reticent,t 5 ineffective,' 6 ill-prepared,17 mostly silent, 18 lacking
interest,' 9 rarely extending any effort,20 giving only perfunctory representa-
tion,2' doing little or nothing to obtain a client's release 22 and seldom chal-
lenging adverse statements by witnesses or adverse psychiatric testimony.
23
Lawyers did not explore in court such elemental legal questions as whether
there was any factual basis for a conclusion of dangerousness, whether medi-
cal examinations were thorough, whether a physician's recommendation was
based on conclusory data and whether alternatives to involuntary hospitaliza-
tion existed. 24 Furthermore, in the typical case, counsel hardly could have
known the answers to these questions or been familiar with the facts of a case
since most interviews with clients occurred only a few minutes before hearings
and were quite brief.25 Attorneys in these studies expressed a lack of medical
expertise and a need to rely on psychiatric reports that recommended involun-
tary hospitalization.26 Legal scholars have argued that with such deference to
psychiatry, commitment hearings become "an empty ritual"27 and "add a
falsely reassuring patina of respectability to the proceedings."' 28
13. Not all states provided court hearings for civil commitment. Many states allowed com-
mitment, even in nonemergencies, based on medical certification; and a number of states placed
the commitment decision in the hands of an administrative board that generally had physician
representation. Counsel was not always provided even in those states with court hearings. Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (S. Brakel & R. Rock rev. ed. 1971);
Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190 (1974).
14. Cohen, supra note 9; A. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts
Both Ways, 51 Judicature 370 (1968); innis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Exper-
tise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Special Project, supra note 9;
Developments in the Law, supra note'13.
15. Contemporary Studies Project, Facts and Fallacies About Iowa Civil Commitment, 55
Iowa L. Rev. 895, 918 (1970).
16. Cohen, supra note 9, at 425; Special Project, supra note 9, at 54.
17. Cohen, supra note 9, at 424; Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 15, at 913-14.
18. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 429.
19. Id. at 424.
20. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 9, at 43-44, 72; Cohen, supra note 9, at 424.
21. Special Project, supra note 9, at'52.
22. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 429.
23. Dix, Hospitalization of th6 Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for Reexamination, 51
Marq. L. Rev. I, 9-10 (1967); Special Project, supra note 9, at 52.
24. Cohen, supra note 9, at 429; Dix, supra note 24, at 9-10. See Andalman & Chambers,
supra note 9, at 59-60; Special Project, supra note 9, at 51-52.
25. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 9, at 43; Special Project, supra note 9, at 54; Contem-
porary Studies Project, supra note 15, at 914.
26. Special Project, supra note 9, at 53.
27. Cohen, supra note 9, at 448.
28. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 9, at 72.
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Not all early studies found attorneys to be passive in civil commitment
hearings. One study29 reported that respondents represented by counsel, as
opposed to those without legal representation, had significantly fewer commit-
ments and had significantly longer hearings notwithstanding the actual mental
condition of the respondent involved in the hearing. Since attorneys in that
study were not provided by the State, 30 it is likely that the lawyers were pri-
vately retained for the sole purpose of fighting commitment. In the case of
state-appointed representatives or public defenders, adversarial roles may not
be so frequently performed.3 1 A more recent study32 in Nebraska reported
that there were proportionately fewer commitments among respondents repre-
sented by private counsel than among those represented by appointed counsel
or public defenders. In fact, the latter group had no fewer commitments than
the group of respondents without any legal representation. 33
The spread of the civil rights movement into the area of civil commitment
directed attention to the punitive nature of involuntary hospitalization and to
the abuses34 that commonly occurred when the state paternalistically assumed
the care and custody of allegedly mentally ill persons.35 By emphasizing the
essential police function of mental commitment, civil rights advocates fought
for and obtained, from both federal courts and state legislatures, two major
limitations on state commitment power: (1) application to the commitment
procedures of the principles of due process, including notice, hearing, confron-
tation of witnesses, counsel and judicial review; 36 and (2) establishment of a
requirement of dangerousness coupled with mental illness for involuntary hos-
29. Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospi-
tal: A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 66 (1969).
30. Id.
3 1. For a full discussion of this point, see Goode, supra note 7; Litwack, supra note 9. In our
study, we observed one case to which an attorney was court-appointed but later removed when the
respondent retained private counsel. Both the respondent and his family wanted release. Private
counsel harbored no doubt about his role; hence, he assumed an adversary role to fight commit-
ment on both procedural and substantive grounds. His client's release was obtained; however, if
appointed counsel had represented this respondent he would not have assumed an adversary role
and the respondent would not have been as likely to obtain release. The attorney appointed by
the court told the privately retained counsel that he had read the legal record (consisting of the
petition by a physician and the psychiatrist's affidavit) and on that basis knew the respondent
needed to be committed as dangerous.
32. Peters, Teply, Wunsch, & Zimmerman, Administrative Civil Commitment: The Ins and
Outs of the Nebraska System, 9 Creighton L. Rev. 266 (1976).
33. Id. at 279-80.
34. For instance, one man was confined in a state mental hospital on the basis of an initial
petition alleging delusions and on the basis of a brief psychiatric exam finding paranoid schizo-
phrenia. He was never thought to be dangerous, and several people in the community were will-
ing to assume responsibility for him. See K. Miller, Managing Madness: The Case Against Civil
Commitment 20-26 (1976). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
35. Dershowitz, supra note 14, at 373-77; Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An
Empirical Study in the Courtroom, II Law & Soc'y Rev. 651 (1977); Zander, supra note 9, at 504;
Special Project, supra note 9, at 5-8.
36. E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); In re Bailey, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384
F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated
and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473, order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (1976); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd in part sub. nom.
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pitalization. 37 Implied in these procedural and substantive changes is the ex-
pectation that the court will reach its result on legal grounds rather than
depend upon purely psychiatric information. 38 The court may accept medical
opinion; but to achieve the intended independence from psychiatric expertise,
it must refuse to accept psychiatric conclusions without supporting facts.
What are the implications for the role of counsel under these new directions in
civil commitment law?
Most reform statutes have not defined the role of counsel, and only a few
courts have spoken directly to the issue. The three-judge federal district court
that decided Lessard v. Schmidt,39 the most extensive explication of civil com-
mitment law based on the state's police power, held that counsel should as-
sume an adversarial role, acting as an advocate for his clients' expressed
wishes.40 The court found that appointment of a guardian ad litem who
would work within a paternalistic model "cannot satisfy the constitutional re-
quirement of representative counsel."'4' In another case, the Washington
Supreme Court held that even if a statute required appointment of a guardian
ad litem, counsel was to act as an advocate for his client and could not waive
any fundamental rights without the client's consent. 42 Similar conclusions
have been reached by a federal district court in Alabama 43 and by the
Supreme Court of West Virginia.44
The ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled also recommended an
adversarial role for counsel in civil commitment proceedings. The Commis-
sion's proposed statute states that an attorney shall "serve as advocate for the
client's liberty, release or such alternative placement as the client desires."'45
At the level of the practicing attorney in the civil commitment court, however,
there has been no general acceptance of an adversarial role.
After Lessard, Wisconsin's attorneys assumed either an adversarial or a
paternalistic role according to the judge's view of the foundation for civil com-
mitment. In courts in which the foundation wasparenspatriae, appointed at-
torneys assumed a passive role, and there was a higher commitment rate than
in courts in which the foundation was police power and appointed counsel
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally D. Wexler, supra note 8, at 209
n.44; Developments in the Law, supra note 13.
37. By 1978, 48 states had adopted commitment codes that incorporated dangerousness into
their criteria for involuntary commitment to a mental facility. Schwitzgebel, Survey of State Civil
Commitment Statutes, in Civil Commitment and Social Policy 47-83 (A. McGarry, R.
Schwitzgebel, P. Lipsitt & D. Lelos eds. 1981).
38. See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (dictum). See generally Special
Project, supra note 9.
39. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
40. Id. at 1097-99.
41. Id. at 1099.
42. In re Quesnell, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 234-40, 517 P.2d 568, 575-78 (1974).
43. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 389
(5th Cir. 1981).
44. State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
45. ABA Comm. on the Mentally Disabled, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care: Pro-
posals for Change 286 (1981).
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assumed an active adversary role.46
Following reform in New York, attorneys47 representing respondents in
civil commitment hearings varied in the role they assumed depending upon
their evaluation of each case.48 When they assumed an adversary role seeking
their client's release both before and during hearings, the commitment rate
was significantly lower because psychiatrists discharged respondents outside of
court or because the court ordered release.49
The reform statute in Iowa required that civil commitment hearings be
conducted in an adversarial manner;50 however, attorneys continued to defer
to medical expertise. Accordingly, they rarely employed adversarial tech-
niques such as vigorous cross examination of witnesses and second psychiatric
examinations, 5' available at state expense. 52 Most referees in Iowa favor a
paternalistic model and nonadversarial hearings.53 Under these conditions it
is not surprising that attorneys do not assume an adversarial stance. Several
attorneys stated that, given the referees' predilections, an adversarial stance
would hurt their clients' chances of release. 5
4
Despite heavy publicity surrounding California's passage of the Lanter-
man-Petris-Short Act 55 and its emphasis on protection of individual rights,
many lawyers assumed a paternalistic role in the commitment process and
ritualistically moved through the motions of legal form. 56 One public de-
fender who vigorously advocated his client's release was dismissed from his
job for failing to share the paternalistic viewpoint of the judge and other pub-
lic defenders.5 7
In one Virginia county, court-appointed attorneys in civil commitment
regularly waived all of their clients' rights, failed to assure that commitment
criteria were addressed in court and assisted the court in rushing through per-
functory hearings.58 Every one of their clients was involuntary hospitalized. 59
46. See generally Zander, supra note 9.
47. These attorneys worked full-time for the Mental Health Information Service, a state
agency designed to help both respondents and the court in legal and social problems that might
arise as a result of civil commitment. Kumasaka & Gupta, Lawyers and Psychiatrists in Court:
Issues on Civil Commitment, 32 Md. L. Rev. 6, 6 (1972).
48. Kumasaka & Stokes, Involuntary Hospitalization: Opinions and Attitudes of Psychia-
trists and Lawyers, 13 Comprehensive Psychiatry 201 (1972).
49. Id. See also Kumasaka, Stokes & Gupta, Criteria for Involuntary Hospitalization, 26
Archives Gen. Psychiatry 399 (1972).
50. Iowa Code § 229 (Supp. 1981). See Bezanson, Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally III
in Iowa: The 1975 Legislation, 61 Iowa L. Rev. 261 (1975).
51. Iowa Project, supra note 9, at 1405-06, 1411.
52. Iowa Code §§ 229.10(1), .12(1) (Supp. 1981).
53. Iowa Project, supra note 9, at 1396-97, 1411.
54. Id. at 1396-97.
55. Law of Sept. 2, 1967, ch. 1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. Stat. 4053, 4074 (codified as amended at
Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code §§ 5000-5466 (West 1972 & West Supp. 1981)).
56. C. Warren, Court of Last Resort: Judicial Review of Involuntary Civil Commitment in
California - (in press 1982). In the Los Angeles court under study, lawyers from the public
defender's office provided legal representation in civil commitment. Id. at
57. Id. at
58. Complaint and Motion to Proceed Anonymously, Woe v. Arlington County Gen. Dist.
Court, Civ. No. 79-79-A (E.D. Va. complaint dismissed Mar. 23, 1979).
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Following litigation and consequent press attention, legal representation re-
portedly is more active.60
A study conducted one year after the 1973 reform in North Carolina6 l
showed that appointed counsel varied widely in the roles they performed. 62
Most did not argue in any way for their clients' release.63 In a substantial
minority of cases, however, attorneys did assume an adversarial role by chal-
lenging adverse testimony, presenting evidence favorable to their clients, and
making direct arguments to the court in favor of release or alternative treat-
ment.64 In these cases the commitment rate was significantly lower than in
those cases in which the attorney assumed a nonadversarial stance. 65
One might infer that respondents whose attorneys did not advocate re-
lease and who were subsequently committed were more mentally ill and more
dangerous than respondents whose lawyers argued for release; however, this
has not been the case. Many respondents in these studies were committed
without the statutorily required evidence of dangerousness. 66 In Iowa, respon-
dents were committed on the basis of little evidence beyond unchallenged
medical testimony;67 those committed in Wisconsin courts under aparenspa-
triae foundation rarely had evidence of acts of substantial harm to self or
others presented against them.68 In the North Carolina study, forty-two per-
cent of contested cases resulted in commitments without clear, cogent and con-
59. Id. The Mental Health Law Project brought suit in federal court to assure that civil
commitment respondents in this count would receive effective representation. The case was dis-
missed without opinion. Woe v. Arlington County Gen. Dist. Court, 620 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1980)
(mem.).
60. Mental Health Law Project, A Summary of Activities, July 1979-June 1981 (1981).
61. In 1973 the General Assembly repealed Law of June 25, 1963, ch. 1184, § 2, 1963 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1640, 1647-48, which had provided for admission to mental health facilities by medical
certification, and enacted a new law providing for commitment proceedings. Law of May 23,
1973, ch. 726, §§ 1, 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1074 (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 122-58.1 to .23 (1981)).
62. Hiday, supra note 9.
63. Id. at 558-60.
64. Id. at 559.
65. Id. at 560.
66. Based on criteria developed for the Hiday study. Id. at 561. Questions about mental
illness, also required for commitment, rarely were raised because attorneys and judges saw mental
illness as being clearly in the realm of medical expertise. If a psychiatrist diagnosed mental ill-
ness, it was generally accepted as fact. Id.
67. Iowa Project, supra note 9.
68. Zander, supra note 9. Following this study, commitments in theparenspatriae court were
appealed to a higher court. Citing counsel's failure to cross examine two of every three witnesses
and their asking an average of only two questions per witness, the Wisconsin circuit court indicted
the shoddy legal representation of respondents committed by this court. Wisconsin ex rel. Mem-
mel v. Mundy, No. 441-417, slip op. (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1976), appeal dismissed and rights
declared, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977). It went on to say:
The record presented by this case is as bleak a picture as has probably ever been
presented of justice in Milwaukee County. A massive and systematic deprivation of the
constitutional rights of people who are unable to voice their own protests has been ac-
complished by the cooperation of the bench and bar of Milwaukee County. . . . [T]he
onus of the debacle lies squarely with the lawyers and judges who operated this "greased
runway" to the county mental health center . . ..
Id., slip op. at 15.
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vincing evidence of imminent danger.69 Researchers in these studies
concluded that an adversarial stance by counsel would have prevented com-
mitments in those cases that did not meet the criteria of dangerousness and in
those cases in which the state was not prepared to put forth evidence to make
its case.70
To summarize, despite recent judicial and statutory emphasis on the dep-
rivation of liberty in civil commitment and the accompanying substantive and
procedural reforms, lawyers throughout the United States have not consist-
ently changed their approach to an adversarial role in representing respon-
dents.7 ' Many still cling to a paternalistic model. Furthermore, many lawyers
still defer to psychiatric opinion without employing careful fact-finding tech-
niques to assure that only those who meet the statutory criteria are committed.
Some attorneys refrain from assuming an adversarial role because the presid-
ing officer of the court views commitment paternalistically; others refrain be-
cause they themselves view commitment paternalistically and defer to medical
opinion. Some dispense with an adversarial role because there is no legal rep-
resentation for the State/petitioner and the court would not be able to weigh
all evidence. Still others fail to advocate their respondents' interests only
when they make up their own minds that their clients meet the commitment
criteria.
In an effort to determine how lawyers and judges in North Carolina view
their role in the civil commitment process, the author conducted a study seek-
ing the answers to such questions as: How do counsel in this state view their
role after the basic procedural and substantive reforms have been in operation
for a substantial period of time?72 Are attorneys in North Carolina different
from attorneys in other states? Are there systematic differences between those
attorneys working full-time representing civil commitment respondents in
state mental hospitals and those appointed counsel and public defenders in
judicial districts without a state mental hospital? We sought answers to these
questions directly, by asking counsel and judges who participate in civil com-
mitment hearings how they view counsel's role; and indirectly, by recording
attorney behavior in civil commitment hearings and in preparation for these
hearings.
69. Based on criteria developed for the study. Hiday, supra note 35, at 663. At the time of
the North Carolina study, the statute required that the danger to self or others be imminent.
"Imminently" was removed as a qualifier of"dangerous" in G.S. 122-58.1 by Law of June 8, 1979,
ch. 915, § 2, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1260 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.1 (1981)).
70. See Hiday, supra note 9. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1283-90,
1394-98.
71. See text accompanying and articles cited in notes 46-59 supra.
72. The basic reform of civil commitment procedures and criteria occurred in 1973. See note
61 supra. Since that time the statutes have been revised to clarify some areas of confusion, to
rectify technical problems in the proceedings, and to improve the general functioning of the com-
mitment process. See, e.g., Law of Apr. 13, 1973, ch. 1408, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 783;
Law of May 17, 1977, ch. 400, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 402; Law of June 22, 1977, ch. 679,
1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 805; Law of June 24, 1977, chs. 738-39, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st
Sess. 962; Law of June 8, 1979, ch. 915, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1260 (these modifications
have been codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 122-58.1 to .26 (1981)).
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THE NORTH CAROLINA STUDY
As part of a larger study of 1135 civil cases throughout North Carolina
between March and September 1979, we observed 479 initial hearings of re-
spondents alleged to be dangerously mentally ill.7 3 Two observers, 74 each us-
ing a detailed checklist, 75 independently recorded testimony and statements by
lawyers and judges during each hearing. Checklist items were supplemented
by note taking of relevant statements and behaviors. Following a day in court,
the observers discussed each case to make sure both checklists covered every
statement. Additionally, the investigators interviewed each lawyer on the day
of hearing concerning his preparation for each case.76 Six months after the
court observation period ended, we interviewed by telephone or in person the
same attorneys and judges concerning their views of counsel's role.77
STATED VIEWS OF COUNSEL'S ROLE
Table I presents proposed statements on counsel's role in civil commit-
ment, to which attorneys and judges were asked to respond.78 Generally, at-
torneys in North Carolina preferred the paternalistic model in civil
commitment proceedings. They agreed overwhelmingly with the statement,
"Representing respondents in civil commitment cases should be different from
representing other kinds of clients since hospitalization may be in the best
interest of the client." Similarly, the lawyers tended to disagree with the state-
ment, "The role of the attorney in the civil commitment process should be the
73. The larger study included cases of dangerous mentally ill respondents who had had no
hearings, and of dangerous inebriate respondents whose cases were divided both with and without
hearings. Respondents who were found not to meet the commitment criteria often were released
before their scheduled hearings, and the court dismissed their cases without holding any hearings,
Inebriate respondents are handled differently by state mental hospitals and the courts. Generally
they are detoxified and then released or recommended for release by psychiatrists because they no
longer meet the dangerousness criterion (defined in N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 122-58.2(1) (1981)). In some
courts, the only inebriate respondents who have hearings are those whose families come to court
and insist that they be involuntarily hospitalized. V. Hiday & S. Markell, Components of Danger-
ousness: Legal Standards in Civil Commitment, 3 Int'l J.L. & Psychiatry 405 (1981).
74. Sickness, death and coding errors took a toll of 3 attorneys and 2 judges, leaving a sample
of 44judges and 58 attorneys. On a few occasions, schedule conflicts prevented the research group
from sending two observers. The one observer who attended in those few cases was an exper-
ienced faculty researcher.
75. A copy of the checklist can be found in the Appendix, infra.
76. Because of limited time between hearings in some courts, some lawyers were reached by
telephone after the day of hearings. Because Special Counsel represented so many respondents in
a single day and because they prepared for all cases in essentially the same manner, we sampled
Special Counsel's cases for their prehearing behavior and generalized to all their cases rather than
questioning them on every specific case.
77. Counsel outside of State mental hospitals tended to be young, recent law school gradu-
ates, with limited experience in involuntary civil commitment. Mean age was 34 years, with a
range from 24 to 56 years. Seventy-five percent were under 35 years of age and had been in
practice seven years or less. Mean years of practice was 6.25. Experience with civil commitment
cases was even more limited, with most having handled fewer than seven such cases. Counsel in
state mental hospitals (Special Counsel) also tended to be young (average age 29.6 years) and in
practice a short time (average 3.3 years), but they were quite experienced with civil commitment
cases, having dealt with hundreds of them prior to our study.
78. These statements are modified versions of statements used in an Iowa study. See Iowa
Project, supra note 9, at 1447-52.
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same as in a criminal case, that is, directed toward getting the least restrictive
alternative possible for one's client, which includes avoiding confinement."
There was, however, a sizeable minority who disagreed with the first statement
and agreed with the second statement, indicating that these lawyers preferred
an adversarial role. A few attorneys stated that they took a middle position
and could not agree or disagree with these statements. They presumably
would handle each case differently depending on their judgment of the case.
Another group of attorneys indicated that they too were in a middle ground or
were ambiguous about their role since they agreed with the first statement and
also agreed with the second statement.79
A majority agreed with the third statement, that "[tihe role of the attorney
in civil commitment cases should be to raise all relevant evidence about the
respondent, that is, present both sides so that the court can decide." In their
responses to this statement, attorneys once again indicated that they should
not assume an adversarial role in civil commitment. Since most judicial dis-
tricts do not provide an attorney to represent the interests of the state or peti-
tioner, there is no counterbalance to an aggressive role by respondent's
counsel. One might infer that attorneys choose the paternalistic model as op-
posed to an adversarial one because of this lack of balance, but the choice of
role is not so simple. In those judicial districts employing legal representation
for the State/petitioner, attorneys80 were more likely to prefer an adversarial
role, agreeing with the statement that their role should be the same as in a
criminal case; but even in those districts, three-fifths agreed with the first state-
ment, that their role is different in civil commitment because hospitalization
may be best for a client. Fewer of them agreed with the third statement, that
counsel's role is to raise all relevant evidence so the court can decide; but still
the proportion agreeing represents half of all such attorneys.8 1 It appears that
an adversarial role is not clearly adopted by attorneys who face opposing
counsel.
Judges were more likely than attorneys to prefer the paternalistic model,
as they were approximately twenty percent more likely to favor the first state-
ment and to disagree with the second statement. Judges also were more likely
to agree with the third statement, that an attorney should present both sides so
that the court can decide. Less than twenty percent of judges demonstrated
approval of the adversarial model by disagreeing with the first statement and
agreeing with the second statement; but more (almost one-third) disagreed
with the third statement, that the lawyer should present both sides. In those
judicial districts with legal representation for the State/petitioner, a higher
proportion of judges supported an adversary model, agreeing that counsel's
role was the same as in a criminal case and disagreeing that representing re-
spondents in civil commitment should be different from representing other
kinds of clients; however, these proportions still represent only a minority (less
79. Table 1, Appendix infra.
80. There were twenty attorneys in this group.
81. That is, 10 attorneys out of the 20 attorneys in this group.
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than one-third each). 2 Hence, even in courts with lawyers representing both
sides, judges tend to take a beneficent view of civil commitment and prefer the
paternalistic model for the role of counsel.
To attempt to find one underlying value that would explain the choice of
role model, we posed three other forced-choice statements. These statements
attempted to ascertain whether attorneys and judges view the commitment
process as a medical matter or a legal matter (Table 1). Responses to the state-
ment that taps the question directly, the fourth statement, show attorneys
fairly evenly split, with one-third each saying that it is more a legal mat-
ter/problem, that it is more a medical problem, and that it is equally a legal
and medical problem. Judges were less likely to say it is more a legal problem
(16.3 percent) and more likely to say it is both (58.1 percent). When asked to
respond to the proposition that counsel's role should be secondary to the psy-
chiatrist's (the fifth statement), however, almost two-thirds of both counsel and
judges disagreed with the statement. Although approximately one-third in
each group agreed, responses to this statement hardly indicate that attorneys
and judges are willing to turn the procedure over to psychiatrists. This fifth
statement provoked many in our sample to react negatively to the idea of a
lawyer's role being secondary to anyone. Those seemed to be "fighting words"
that obtained the strongest reaction from both attorneys and judges to any
statement on counsel's role.8 3 If this were not indicative of support for an
adversarial role, responses to this statement would seem to indicate preference
for a role independent of psychiatry in which counsel and court would decide
respondents' best interests.
A majority of attorneys (58.6 percent) disagreed with the sixth statement,
"When an attorney can see that a respondent is sick, he should not argue for
release of the respondent," thus indicating their view that commitment is more
than a medical matter. This is a surprisingly small majority, however, given
that the law states that a respondent must be not only mentally ill but also
dangerous to be committed. Despite the law, judges tended to agree with this
statement. Only 37.2 percent of judges disagreed with the sith statement,
while 46.5 percent of them agreed.84 One might infer that those who agreed
with this statement do not understand the law or that their strong paternalistic
concern for the mentally ill overrides their concern for civil liberties.
Responses to the last three statements in Table 1 imply that a significant
percentage of both judges and attorneys adhere to aparenspatriae foundation
of civil commitment. Many view it more as a medical than as a legal problem,
seeing counsers role as secondary to the psychiatrist's and opting for a
nonadversarial stance when mental illness is present. At the same time, an-
other significant percentage seems to take a legal view of civil commitment
and see counsel as primary in the process. This view is not opposite to the first
82. There were 20 judges from judicial districts with legal representation for the
State/petitioner. Fewer than seven of these judges supported an adversarial model.
83. Table I, Appendix infra.
84. Id.
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because it could still represent a paternalistic stance; that is, counsel would
decide what is best for the client and act to obtain it. The difference is that the
paternalism in this case would be counsel's deciding the necessity of commit-
ment rather than counsel's deferring to the psychiatrist's decision. Another
significant percentage of judges and attorneys are in the middle, apparently
seeing civil commitment as a problem that is equally legal and medical. The
positions of all three groups are compatible with the paternalistic model of
counsel's role for which the majority showed preference in their responses to
the first three statements.
COUNSEL'S BEHAVIOR
Because what a person says and what he does are not necessarily congru-
ent, we obtained behavioral measures of counsel's role as well as their stated
views of that role. These measures are divided into two groups-behavior in
court and behavior in preparation for court. We also divided attorneys into
two groups-(a) Special Counsel (State-employed) and (b) all others (outside
counsel), most of whom are appointed. Public defenders and a few privately
retained counsel are included in the latter category.
Table 2 presents the objective measures of counsel's behavior in court.
The major observation from this table is the infrequency with which either
type of counsel was active. Outside counsel challenged the written medical
report on the basis of inadequate facts of mental illness or imminent danger-
facts required by law on the physician's affidavit-in only 4.7 percent of cases.
In the other 95.3 percent, outside counsel either stipulated to the medical re-
port or said nothing. Challenges to the medical reports were rare even though
the reports frequently did not contain the required facts indicating mental ill-
ness or dangerousness (22.1 percent).85 Failure to record appropriate facts on
the medical affidavit, as well as failure to follow any other required procedure,
can be cause for dismissal of the action. A few attorneys stated that they al-
most always could obtain a respondent's release because some requirement
was not followed, such as inadequate facts in support of mental illness in the
physician's affidavit or in the petition; however, in only 11.6 percent of cases
did outside counsel argue for dismissal.8 6
Outside counsel almost never argued that the respondent was not men-
tally ill (2.3 percent). Attorneys in this group were more likely to argue that
the dangerousness criteria were not met because the respodent was not danger-
ous at all or that the danger was not imminent (11.6 percent). In 18.6 percent
of cases, outside counsel requested release or an alternative to commitment for
the respondent. In 3.5 percent of cases, respondents' representatives pointed
85. The physician's affidavit form has a blank space for "facts indicating mental illness" and
another blank space for "facts indicating dangerousness." In 5.0% of all cases, facility psychia-
trists wrote nothing in either of the two appropriate spaces on the official form; in 0.4% they wrote
only a diagnosis; in 0.5% they wrote facts, such as "cannot sleep at night," that did not indicate
mental illness or dangerousness; and in 16.2% they failed in one of these ways to write the re-
quired facts in only one of the appropriate spaces.
86. Table i, Appendix infra.
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out the positive characteristics of the respondent that indicated capacity to live
safely outside the hospital. In very few cases (1.2 percent) did outside counsel
point out the negative aspects of hospitalization, or ways in which the respon-
dent might be adversely affected by commitment; in the same low percentage
of cases lawyers argued that conflicting testimony acted to nullify the alleged
mental illness or dangerousness alleged in the petition.87
On the other hand, outside attorneys were active in admitting mental ill-
ness and imminent danger in 3.5 percent of cases, requesting commitment in
8.1 percent of the cases, and pointing out the hospital's positive aspects in 2.3
percent of the cases. In an additional 14.0 percent of cases they stated that the
respondent wanted to go along with the physician's recommendation of invol-
untary commitment. In most cases, however, outside counsel made none of
these arguments. 88
Special Counsel generally showed a greater tendency toward activity, but
for none of the measures was the difference between counsel types significant.
These State-employed attorneys reported that often they did not challenge the
medical report because the judge would have summoned the facility psychia-
trist, who would have given testimony more damaging to the respondent than
what was written in the legal record. Thus, apparent passivity actually may
have been contrived silence, a tactic used by some special counsel to obtain
release or a less restrictive alternative. In only 6.6 percent of the cases did
Special Counsel state that the respondent was willing to follow the doctor's
recommendation of commitment, and attorneys in this group requested com-
mitment for their clients in less than 1.0 percent of cases.89
Besides making direct arguments to court, counsel may be active by chal-
lenging adverse testimony that fails to meet appropriate evidentiary standards.
In only 15.8 percent of cases did outside counsel object to conclusory or irrele-
vant statements or to hearsay. We did not attempt to code the incidence of
witnesses giving this testimony because it would have required a level of ex-
pertise in trial advocacy available only to experienced trial attorneys and not
possessed by our observers. We cannot say how often in noncommitment
cases this type of evidence is admitted without objection by counsel.90 In
some cases the judge or attorney for the State/petitioner(s) 91 prevented the
testimony from coming into evidence even when counsel for respondent did




90. A better measure of counsel's activity would be the proportion of proper objections made
out ofall cases in which an objection should have been made. Lacking training and experience in
litigation, the team declined to make such an assessment.
91. Only three counties (Cumberland, Forsyth and Macon) other than counties with state
mental hospitals provided legal representation for the State/petitioner.
92. If the attorney for the State/petitioner or the judge did not allow irrelevant, hearsay or
conclusory statements to enter into evidence, then counsel would not have to object. In most civil
commitment courts that we observed, however, all three types of statements appeared to have
been made frequently.
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ments almost twice as often as outside counsel (31.7 percent to 15.8 percent).93
Many witnesses, especially those of lower socio-economic status, 94 did not
present clear, cogent and convincing evidence necessary to show facts of
mental illness and imminent danger. They frequently made general state-
ments without giving specific facts. If appropriate factual evidence on which
the court can make a decision about commitment is to be presented, then re-
spondent's counsel, counsel for the State/petitioner, and often the judge, gen-
erally must question witnesses about the specific acts, timing, or circumstances
of the allegedly dangerous behavior. In 55.3 percent of cases, outside counsel
questioned witnesses on the specific allegedly dangerous behavior, on the tim-
ing of that behavior or on the circumstances surrounding it. Special Counsel
did so in 44.1 percent of cases. Both types of counsel showed more activity on
this measure than on other measures. Even here, however, in nearly half the
cases outside state mental hospitals and in over half of those within state
mental hospitals, counsel for respondent was not active.95
Table 3 presents the behavior of attorneys in preparation for their cases in
court as reported by the attorneys themselves. From our observations, it is
clear that prior to the hearing, outside counsel usually read the legal record,
which typically consisted of the petition, one or two physical affidavits and an
indigency report. Preparation in other ways left much to be desired, as can be
seen in Table 3. Outside attorneys either did not speak with their clients, or
spoke with them only a few minutes before hearings, in 39.5 percent of cases.
The 60.5 percent who did speak with their clients more than a few minutes
prior to hearings represents an improvement over the general lack of discus-
sion with respondents reported in previous studies.96 All of these discussions
between the outside counsel and respondent client took place in person. Mean
time spent with client was 15.9 minutes, with a range of 1.0 minute to 4.5
hours. Forty-two percent spoke for ten minutes or less, and 87 percent spoke
for 30 minutes or less.
Outside counsel's preparation for hearings was even less adequate when
measured by attempted fact-finding from persons other than the respondent.
In only 16.0 percent of cases did outside counsel speak with petitioner(s); in
only 15.6 percent did outside counsel speak with facility psychiatrists who
93. Table 2, Appendix infra.
94. Most civil commitment respondents in our sample, as well as most patients admitted to
state mental hospitals, were members of the lower socioeconomic class. Sample mean monthly
income was $202 for those whose record contained income information; and over two-thirds had a
monthly income of $250 or less, with just over 14% having no income. Seldom do middle class or
upper middle class persons become respondents to involuntary commitment proceedings. Only
eleven respondents had reported monthly incomes of over $500, and of those without income
information, only 3.1% could be classified as upper middle class on the basis of speech, dress,
education or occupation of either themselves or their families. One-fourth of all witnesses were
respondents. Parents, children and spouses represented 31% of witnesses; and other relatives,
friends and neighbors represented 14% of witnesses. The majority of witnesses, thus, were lower
class.
95. Table 2, Appendix infra.
96. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 9, at 55-72; Cohen, supra note 9, at 428; Dix, supra
note 24, at 9-10; Special Project, supra note 9, at 32-33, 38-60; Contemporary Studies Project,
supra note 15, at 913-16.
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were giving the expert opinion and recommendation to commit; and in only
8.9 percent did the attorneys speak with any other witnesses. In sum, outside
attorneys were not active in preparation for civil commitment cases.
Special Counsel, in contrast, always spoke with respondents in person
prior to the day of hearing. Mean time with clients was longer-22.2 minutes,
with a range of 2 to 45 minutes. State-employed attorneys were more likely to
speak with clients prior to hearings because their law offices are located in the
state mental hospitals and because their entire practice consists of representing
involuntary commitment respondents.
Lack of proximity to respondents was a problem for outside counsel par-
ticularly when there was a change of venue. In that situation the respondent
was brought to the county of petition immediately prior to the hearing. In
only one-third of these cases did outside counsel speak to respondents ahead
of time. Many outside attorneys cited the low per-hour payment of court-
appointed attorneys as the explanation. They argued that, at thirty-five to fifty
dollars per case, a lawyer could not afford to drive one hour or more each way
to the state hospital to interview a respondent prior to his hearing. (Some trial
judges in fact paid outside counsel more per case.) Nonetheless, even when
respondents were being held in the county of hearing, outside attorneys did
not speak with their clients in 38.1 percent of the cases. Outside court-ap-
pointed attorneys again generally claimed they could not afford the time to
drive to the local hospital for an in-person interview. Unlike other cases, in
which the telephone is used extensively for exchanges with clients, telephoning
was apparently discounted as a method of gaining information from a mental
commitment respondent. Attorneys either assumed irrationality on the part of
these clients, felt an inability to discern a client's mental status over the tele-
phone, or thought the telephone inappropriate for initial conferences with un-
known persons who might be irrational or suspicious.
Special Counsel's location also affected the attorney's ability to find facts
from persons other than the respondent. In 65.5 percent of cases, State-em-
ployed attorneys talked with psychiatrists, and in almost all cases (92.9 per-
cent) they spoke to psychiatrists or staff. Often nurses were used as
informational sources instead of psychiatrists. Special Counsel indicated that
nurses' daily contact with respondents gave them more knowledge than psy-
chiatrists who saw respondents approximately once a week.
Special Counsel, however, did attempt negotiations with psychiatrists in a
substantial number of cases. When psychiatrists initially recommended com-
mitment (52.4 percent of all cases), Special Counsel attempted to persuade
them to recommend release or an alternative in 38.1 percent of the cases. Of
the 70.4 percent of cases in which Special Counsel talked with psychiatrists,
the attorneys tried actively to negotiate 62.5 percent of the time. State-em-
ployed attorneys in civil commitment cases generally plea bargain with the
psychiatrist in the same manner that criminal defense attorneys bargain with
the prosecutor. Psychiatrists may be medical professionals, but their role in
civil commitment is similar to the prosecutor's because they can drop, reduce
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or advance charges of mental illness and imminent dangerousness. Similarly,
they can recommend release, less restrictive alternatives or commitment. 97
Plea bargaining was a frequent tactic of Special Counsel, often resulting in a
psychiatrist's recommendation of release or a less restrictive alternative that
the court generally approved. Outside counsel seldom even spoke with psychi-
atrists, and plea bargaining is evidently not a favorite tool of outside counsel;
bargaining was attempted in only 27.3 percent of the 15.6 percent of cases in
which outside counsel spoke with the psychiatrist. 98
Special Counsel spoke with petitioners in only 5.0 percent of cases. This
was partly a problem of making long-distance contact. Attorneys in this group
also reported that often they did not want to talk with petitioners because
adverse testimony at the hearing would be more likely if they reminded peti-
tioners of hearings. At other times when petitioners felt that respondents had
improved and could come home, Special Counsel wanted them to testify. One
attorney said he never contacted petitioners because he did not want to be in
the position of pressuring the State's witnesses. Overall, Special Counsel were
active in preparation for civil commitment hearings, particularly when com-
pared with outside counsel.99
Preparation of most outside counsel falls short of the basic preparation
expected of a lawyer in any case, that is, interviewing the client and potential
witnesses on all relevant facts and circumstances, with subsequent investiga-
tion of those facts.' 00 Attorneys who did little to prepare for their cases often
were embarrassed by our questioning of their preparation. Some became pro-
gressively hostile as each answer revealed that they had done nothing. Others
became defensive, offering excuses for their lack of preparation such as:
"They are crazy, so what good would it do to talk to them"; "I could tell from
the record Mrs. X was mentally ill and dangerous so I didn't need to talk with
anyone"; "We handle these cases no differently from (the way we handle)
criminal cases: read the file just before court and talk to the defendant then."
The meager efforts of outside counsel to prepare for their cases belie their
stated paternalistic view of counsel's role in civil commitment and their opin-
ion that counsel's role should not be secondary to the psychiatrist's. One can-
not play a primary role and represent a respondent's best interests (however
interpreted) if he is uninformed or informed only by a single brief interview
97. One might argue that mental illness is not analogous to crime, thereby questioning the
propriety of "plea bargaining" in civil commitment. Like crime, however, mental illness varies in
its seriousness and level of offense. Similarly, it is the police power of the state that justifies
confinement of the mentally ill who are dangerous to others. Furthermore, counsel has much
leeway in negotiating with psychiatrists since indications of dangerousness are often inadequate.
In witness testimony, 42% of the commitment cases had no evidence of assault, threat, property
attack or unintentional harm (such as wandering in the middle of a busy street). See V. Hiday &
S. Markell, supra note 73, at 410. See also note 85 supra, for inadequate indications of dangerous-
ness and mental illness on the psychiatric affidavit.
98. Table 3, Appendix infra.
99. Id.
100. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 6-4 (1979) states that "[an attorney's] obli-
gation to his client requires him to prepare adequately for and give appropriate attention to his
legal work."
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with his client and a reading of the official record. Most respondents have
limited verbal ability' 0' and are often medicated to the point of slow thought,
speech and movement at the time of the interview; ' 0 2 official records often do
not fully describe behavior indicative of mental illness and dangerousness,
much less describe extenuating circumstances; 0 3 and psychiatrists often rely
on what is written in the petitions for evidence of dangerousness. 1'4 There-
fore, an attorney needs to do more than read official records and talk briefly
with clients if he is to represent the best interests of civil commitment
respondents.
EFFECTS ON COMMITMENTS
Given outside counsel's poor preparation and inactivity in court, one
might expect that many respondents who do not meet the substantive criteria
for involuntary hospitalization would be committed to North Carolina mental
hospitals. This, however, is not the case. Although attorneys appear to be
deferring to psychiatric opinion by their behavior in and out of court, judges
do not follow suit. When lawyers are passive, judges often question witnesses
about specific, allegedly dangerous acts, their timing and circumstances; thus,
they act to bring forth evidence concerning imminent'0 5 dangerousness 106 or
the lack thereof. Furthermore, judges do not commit respondents to involun-
tary hospitalization without at least a preponderance of evidence of imminent
dangerousness.' 0 7 We observed only sixteen hearings in which respondents
were committed with less than a preponderance of evidence of acts or threats
101. This conclusion is based on observations of respondents' testimony in court.
102. The extent of medication was evident from observations of respondents in court and from
statements by Special Counsel and judges. One respondent told her attorney that she had been
walking the halls for an hour prior to coming to court in order to fight the grogginess induced by
medication. She was afraid that her slow responses would be interpreted by the court as evidence
of mental illness.
103. See note 85 supra.
104. Much allegedly dangerous behavior of involuntary civil commitment respondents occurs
in the community prior to examination by a physician. Since the psychiatrist's job does not in-
clude tracking down witnesses to acts occurring outside the hospital, he must trust what others tell
him for indications of dangerousness.
105. At the time of this study, one statutory criterion was still "imminently dangerous" instead
of simply "dangerous" as it is now. See note 69 supra.
106. Hiday, Court Decisions in Civil Commitment: Independence or Deference?, 4 Int'l J.L,
& Psychiatry 159 (1981).
One case observed by the author depicts an extreme example of a judge's having to question
witnesses when counsel failed to do so. Appointed counsel stated at the beginning of a hearing
that the respondent acknowledged his mental illness and was willing to follow the psychiatrist's
recommendation of involuntary hospitalization. When the judge asked the respondent ifthis were
true, and the respondent answered in the negative, the judge asked the respondent to take the
witness stand. Hearing no evidence of dangerousness and having no other potential witness pres-
ent, the judge phoned the respondent's psychiatrist and requested his appearance. It was only
after the judge questioned the psychiatrist on the witness stand and obtained behavioral evidence
of the respondent's dangerousness that he committed the respondent.
107. The North Carolina statute reads: "To support a commitment order, the court is re-
quired to find, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or
inebriate, and dangerous to himself or others, or is mentally retarded, and because of an accompa-
nying behavior disorder, is dangerous to others." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.7(i) (1981).
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that could cause substantial physical harm.10 8
Despite judges' preference for a paternalistic role of counsel and their
apparent reliance on the parens patriae foundation of civil commitment,
judges are not deferring to psychiatrists. Rather, they are insisting on behav-
ioral evidence of imminent dangerousness before ordering involuntary hospi-
talization. If their beneficent view of civil commitment is not influencing them
to defer to psychiatric opinion, as it has done in other states, what is influenc-
ing North Carolina judges in their decisions? One explanation may be that
district court judges are sensitive to being reversed; the North Carolina Court
of Appeals has reversed a number of district commitment decisions that were
not based on behavioral evidence of imminent dangerousness.' 0 9
We thus come full circle to the role of counsel, because attorneys repre-
senting civil commitment respondents have brought these cases to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. Some of these cases are appeals brought by Spe-
cial Counsel." 10 While most attorneys do not assume an adversarial stance in
civil commitment, enough do act as advocates to sensitize judges to follow a
legal model rather than a medical model regardless of the behavior of the
individual attorneys in their districts.
CONCLUSION
While diagnosis and treatment of mental illness may be a medical prob-
lem properly entrusted to those with psychiatric expertise, the decision to force
a person to be treated in a mental hospital is a legal matter because it employs
the coercive powers of the state to deprive an individual of his liberty. The
attorney who focuses on theparenspatriae foundation for civil commitment
overlooks the deprivation of freedom involved in these proceedings. He also
overlooks other deprivations that accompany involuntary placement in a
mental hospital. A commited person loses his right to privacy because he is
under constant observation by both hospital staff and other patients; he may
lose his autonomy through compulsory medication and other intrusive treat-
ment. A committed person may be subjected to a hospital that is inadequately
staffed, overcrowded, unsanitary, deplorably maintained and unable to offer
protection from the brutality of patients and attendants."I I A committed per-
son suffers the social stigma of being a hospitalized mental patient, and worse,
one who has been found dangerous enough to be forcibly hospitalized. This
108. As determined by criteria set forth in Hiday, supra note 106, at 166.
109. E.g., In re Doty, 38 N.C. App. 233, 247 S.E.2d 628 (1978); In re Hogan, 32 N.C. App. 429,
232 S.E.2d 492 (1977); In re Weatherly, 28 N.C. App. 659, 222 S.E.2d 486 (1976); In re Carter, 25
N.C. App. 442, 213 S.E.2d 409 (1975).
110. E.g., In re Doty, 38 N.C. App. 233, 247 S.E.2d 628 (1978).
I1I. See J. Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry (1980); Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane
Places, 179 Sci. 250 (1973); Sheehan, The Patient: Creedmore Psychiatric Center (pt. 1), New
Yorker, May 25, 1981, at 49; Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1197; Citron, Century of
Shame (pt. 1), Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Aug. 17, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
For judicial descriptions of poor conditions in mental hospitals, see Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller,
357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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stigma also may involve more serious long-term consequences, such as the
inability to obtain employment. Attention to the negative consequences of in-
voluntary hospitalization may undermine the attorney's view of civil commit-
ment as beneficent."12
Knowledge of the conditions under which institutional psychiatrists make
their diagnoses and predictions might move attorneys towards an active, if not
an adversarial, role.' 13 Psychiatrists in chronically understaffed state hospitals
are able to spend only minimal time with respondents'14 Their examinations
of respondents tend to be brief, and they rely heavily on reports of other staff
in forming their diagnoses and final recommendations. For indications of
dangerousness, they often rely solely on behavior described in written peti-
tions. Since most allegedly dangerous behavior occurs in the community, psy-
chiatrists are unable to observe signs of dangerousness. Having neither time
nor training to investigate the petitioners' allegations, psychiatrists trust the
truth and accuracy of those allegations and use them in making recommenda-
tions to the court.' 5 Attorneys who defer to psychiatrists are thus relying on
opinions based on hearsay.' 6 An annoying, eccentric individual with non-
112. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 13.
113. One experimental study in Austin, Texas, suggests that knowledge of conditions may
make no difference in counsel's role. A small sample of attorneys was given three hours of train-
ing in coping with psychiatric testimony. The attorneys also received a letter from the chief judge
that stated that the commitment proceeding was adversarial and that the state had the burden of
proof. The "trained" lawyers behaved no differently in civil commitment proceedings than did a
control group of untrained attorneys. Both groups frequently prejudiced the evidence and did
little to prevent their clients' involuntary hospitalization. The researcher felt that "the altruistic
motive to see that a perceived sick person get treatment dominates their behavior." The sample
was extremely small, and the researcher did not reveal details concerning the training. Thus, one
should be skeptical about making any generalizations. N. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil
Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 Law & Hum. Behav. I
(1978).
114. Rosenhan, supra note I ll.
115. Hiday, supra note 106, at 163 n.7.
116. Even worse is the case of relying on the opinions of physicians from less developed coun-
tries, who comprise a significant proportion of physicians at state mental hospitals throughout the
United States. See generally D. Light, Becoming Psychiatrists (1980). Their diagnoses and rec-
ommendations can be based on total misrepresentations of respondent's visible behavior and
statements because of the great cultural ahid language barriers that exist. Moreover, physicians
whose English cannot easily be understood aggravate the cultural barriers and handicap respon-
dents in their attempts to provide meaningful responses to physicians' questions. For instance, we
observed one foreign psychiatrist who could not be understood even after being asked to repeat
his responses to questions several times. After he left the courtroom, one attorney said, "He's a
great psychiatrist; he just can't speak English." For a graphic description of the mistakes that can
be made when culture and language bar intelligent communication between patients and psychia-
trists from less developed countries, see Sheehan, supra note I 1l.
Another problem involving both American and foreign psychiatrists occurs when diagnoses
and recommendations are biased in terms of race, sex, age, class, values and prior hospitalization.
See Blake, The Influence of Race on Diagnosis, 43 Smith C. Stud. Soc. Work 184 (1973); Frank,
Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Review of Research, 81 J. Gen. Psychiatry 157 (1969); Lewinson &
York, The Attribution of "Dangerousness" in Mental Health Evaluations, 15 J. Health & Soc.
Behav. 328 (1974); Mendel & Rapport, Determinants of the Decision for Psychiatric Hospitaliza-
tion, 20 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 321 (1969); Schwartz & Abramowitz, Values-Related Effects on
Psychiatric Judgment, 32 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 1525 (1975); Shader, Binstock, Ohly & Scott,
Biasing Factors in Diagnosis and Disposition, 10 Comprehensive Psychiatry 81 (1969). For a
general review of the literature on the validity and reliability of psychiatric diagnosis and predic-
tions of dangerousness, see Ennis & Litwack, supra note 14.
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psychotic mental problems, whose family wants to get rid of him in a mental
hospital, may have no hope for maintaining his liberty unless counsel assumes
a more skeptical view of each step in the commitment procedures. If the right
to counsel is to have any meaning as a due process protection in civil commit-
ment, counsel's role must include a thorough investigation of allegations in the
petition and in the physician's report. This investigation requires counsel to
interview respondents, petitioner(s), other witnesses, psychiatrists and respon-
dent's family and friends. 17 If he finds the allegations untrue or inaccurate,
or if he finds the psychiatrists without a solid basis for an opinion, he may take
an adversarial stance rather than a paternalistic one in the commitment
hearing.' 18
An adversarial stance would not necessarily mean that the attorney would
argue for release of his client. Counsel could argue for a less restrictive alter-
native, such as voluntary hospitalization or outpatient treatment. The North
Carolina statute encourages use of less restrictive alternatives 119 and provides
a procedure for assuring that outpatient commitment orders are followed;' 20
however, less restrictive alternatives, especially outpatient commitments, are
used only infrequently. Courts tend either to commit respondents to involun-
tary hospitalization or to release them. In our sample of initial adult respon-
dents, only 9.2 percent were ordered to less restrictive alternatives, and only
28.1 percent of those were ordered to outpatient commitment in community
health centers. 12 1
Many respondents need psychiatric help because of their mental illness,
and a substantial proportion of these can be treated safely in the community.
One study found only a sixteen percent failure rate among outpatient commit-
ments to community mental health centers.' 22 It should be noted that the
study respondents who were committed to outpatient treatment were carefully
screened by a psychiatrist, a lawyer and the court as good risks for a less re-
strictive alternative. If a component of legal representation is helping a client
to avoid unnecessary involuntary hospitalization, counsel's role in civil com-
mitment requires investigation of the availability of appropriate alternatives
and exploration of their use with his clients and their psychiatrists. The truly
paternalistic and adversarial roles both demand pursuit of less restrictive alter-
natives for clients.
Thorough investigation of allegations of dangerous mental illness and of
117. See note 94 supra.
118. Psychiatrists may also become more thoughtful and deliberate in handling civil commit-
ment respondents when they have to face counsel's challenging questions. See Litwack, supra
note 9, at 839.
119. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.1 (1981). See In re Farrow, 41 N.C. 680, 686, 255 S.E.2d 777,
782 (1979).
120. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.8(b), (c) (1981).
121. V. Hiday & R. Goodman, The Least Restrictive Alternative to Involuntary Hospitaliza-
tion, Outpatient Commitment: Its Use and Effectiveness (unpublished manuscript).
122. Failure is measured by respondents' becoming dangerous or not following commitment
orders and thus having to be involuntarily hospitalized within ninety days of the issuance of their
orders. Id. In North Carolina, initial commitment for inpatient or outpatient treatment is limited
to "a period not in excess of 90 days." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.8(b) (1981).
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less restrictive alternatives requires time, much more time than that expended
by most appointed counsel and public defenders in civil commitment cases.
Appointed counsel, however, are not likely to spend more time without greater
reimbursement for their efforts.' 23 Given the general cutback of government
spending in today's economy, increased funding for appointed counsel is un-
likely. Furthermore, this funding would not affect public defenders who are
paid fixed salaries. Some states have tried legislating counsel's duties to re-
quire a thorough investigation, 2 4 but no studies have reported whether these
efforts have been successful.
Several legal scholars argue that adequate legal representation requires
full-time civil commitment advocates who have the time, expertise and dedica-
tion to represent adequately the rights of the poor and dispossessed who com-
prise the overwhelming majority of respondents.' 25 We have seen that the
full-time counsel at North Carolina state mental hospitals prepare for their
cases and seek alternatives to involuntary hospitalization. Since approxi-
mately eighty percent of respondents in North Carolina are processed through
courts at state mental hospitals,' 26 they have the benefit of full-time civil com-
mitment advocates. The other twenty percent have their hearings in courts
located either in the county of petition, when they request a change of venue,
or in the county in which they are hospitalized. 27 The cost of full-time civil
commitment advocates for this twenty. percent would be prohibitive given the
wide distribution of cases throughout the state and given the time limitation
on hearings.' 28
Although full-time civil commitment advocates have brought time, exper-
tise and dedication to representation of civil commitment respondents, they
have not all chosen an adversarial role for all cases. The question whether
counsel should assume an adversarial or a paternalistic role is essentially a
question of society's values. Does society wish to err on the side of individual
freedom-is it willing to release some dangerously mentally ill persons in or-
der to ensure that no person who is not dangerous or not mentally ill is incar-
cerated? Or does it wish to err on the side of protection-is it willing to allow
some nondangerous or non-mentally ill persons to be hospitalized involunta-
rily rather than risk an individual's harming others or himself?. In the area of
criminal law, our society has opted for protection of individual freedom, and
123. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 9. One should remember that only a small propor-
tion of outside counsel currently are giving the time necessary to fully investigate civil commit-
ment cases despite low reimbursement.
124. For instance, Arizona requires that counsel conduct an interview of the patient within 24
hours of appointment. At least 24 hours before the hearing the attorney must review the applica-
ble paperwork and conduct interviews of the petitioner, the supporting witnesses and the physi-
cians who will testify at the hearing. Failure to comply is punishable by contempt. Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 36-537 (Supp. 1981-82).
125. See Litwack, supra note 9, at 839. See also Andalman & Chambers, supra note 9 at 80-
82.
126. See Hiday, supra note 106, at 161.
127. Id.
128. The hearing must be held within ten days of the respondent's being taken into custody.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.7(a) (1981).
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counsel has clear direction to follow an adversary role. In the area of civil
commitment, our society has not made the value judgment. The choice cur-
rently is left to counsel.
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APPENDIX
Table 1




1. Representing respondents in
civil commitment cases should be
different from representing other
kinds of clients since
hospitalization may be in the best
interests of the client.
2. The role of the attorney in the
civil commitment process should
be the same as in a criminal case,
that is, directed toward getting the
least restrictive alternative possible
for one's client, which includes
avoiding confinement.
3. The role of the attorney in
civil commitment cases should be
to raise all relevant evidence about
the respondent, that is, present
both sides so that the court can
decide.
4. Do you think civil
commitment is more a legal or a
medical problem (matter)?
5. The role of the attorney in the
civil commitment process should
be generally secondary to that of
the psychiatrist who must
determine whether or not a person
is mentally ill and dangerous.
6. When an attorney can see that
a respondent is sick, he should not


























































ATTORNEY'S ROLE IN COMMITMENT
Table 2
STATEMENTS IN COURT BY TYPE OF COUNSEL
Outside Special
Counsel Counsel
N of cases 86 368
Against Commitment % %
Challenge medical report 4.7 6.3
Ask dismissal 11.6 15.8
State no mental illness 2.3 3.3
State no danger, danger not imminent 11.6 14.1
Ask release/alternative 18.6 20.9
Statc respondent's positive traits 3.5 1.1
State negative aspects of hospitalization 1.2 1.4
Point out conflicting testimony 1.2 0.5
Object to hearsay, irrelevant or conclusory
statements* 15.8 31.7
Question acts, timing or circumstances* 55.3 44.1
Supporting Commitment % %
State mental illness and imminent danger 3.5 0.0
Ask commitment 8.1 0.8
State willingness to follow MD's
recommendation of commitment 14.0 6.5
State respondent's negative traits 0.0 0.0
State positive aspects of hospitalization 2.3 0.0
*N of outside counsel cases drops to 76 and N of special counsel cases drops to
281 because of a loss of cases without witness testimony.
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Table 3






N of cases 81 368
Speak with client 60.5% 100.0%
in person 100.0% 100.0%
X time in minutes 15.9 mins. 22.2 mins.
Speak with petitioner(s) 16.0% 5.0%
Speak with psychiatrist 15.6% 70.4%
try to persuade 27.3% 62.5%
Speak with other witnesses 8.9% 42.3%
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Checklist for North Carolina Study
FROM COURT HEARINGS:
- Date of petition
Name Code










































Own income $ monthly








































Hearing date _ Hearing order Hearing County: Name
Code
Place: Hospital? Yes No- Judge: Name Code
Counsel: Respondent waived presence:
Name No
Ct. appointed Cannot communicate
Special counsel - Physically disabled
Public defender R. not want to appear
Private - Other (what?)
1982] 1053



















Less than 5'6" (short)
5'6" - 5'10" (med.)
Less than 5'10" (tall)
Beginning time
Ending time
Total time (in minutes)
COUNSEL'S SUMMA TION:
Move for dismissal? Yes __ No



















Counsel point out negative aspects of hospitalization/commitment:
Yes NM_
ADVOCATE'S SUMMATION:





Not imminently dangerous -
Dangerous













Advocate points out negative effects





























Respondent's Court Number _
Evidence shows mental illness (other than just conclusion):
No - Yes- NM -
Evidence shows dangerousness: No - Yes __ NM __
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ns: Severity:
no harm
serious harm
r. minor harm
r. miniscule harm
NM
Diagnosis (including mental
illness or illness)
Not mentally ill/ill
Is mentally ill/ill
Specific
what?_
NM
Prior hospitalization:
No
Yes
NM
Counsel questions specific
circumstances:
No
Yes
Advocate questions specific
timing:
No
Yes
Judge questions specific:
timing
No
Yes
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Severity:
no damage
serious damage
minor damage
miniscule
damage
NM
